Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as a robust outcome in evolving populations [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Here we extend evolutionary game theory by allowing players' strategies as well as their payoffs to evolve, in response to selection on heritable mutations. In nature, many organisms engage in mutually beneficial interactions [2, [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] , and individuals may seek to change the ratio of risk to reward for cooperation by altering the resources they commit to cooperative interactions. To study this, we construct a general framework for the co-evolution of strategies and payoffs in arbitrary iterated games. We show that, as payoffs evolve, a tradeoff between the benefits and costs of cooperation precipitates a dramatic loss of cooperation under the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; and eventually to evolution away from the Prisoner's Dilemma altogether. The collapse of cooperation is so extreme that the average payoff in a population may decline, even as the potential payoff for mutual cooperation increases. Our work offers a new perspective on the Prisoner's Dilemma and its predictions for cooperation in natural populations; and it provides a general framework to understand the co-evolution of strategies and payoffs in iterated interactions.
Iterated games provide a general framework for studying social interactions [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , allowing researchers to address pervasive biological problems such as the evolution of cooperation and cheating [2, [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . Simple examples such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games [17] [18] [19] [20] showcase a startling array of counter-intuitive social behaviours, especially when studied in a population replicating under natural selection [1, [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] . Despite the subject's long history, a systematic treatment of all robust evolutionary outcomes for even the simple Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has only recently emerged [18, 21, [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] .
In an iterated two-player game, players X and Y face off in an infinite number of successive "rounds". In each round the players simultaneously choose their plays, and they receive associated payoffs. We study games with a 2 × 2 payoff matrix, so that the players have two choices in each round. We label these choices "cooperate" (c) and "defect" (d), using the traditional language for the Prisoner's Dilemma. The four corresponding payoffs for player X are R x = (R x (cc), R x (cd), R x (dc), R x (dd)), where X's play is denoted first. In general, X may choose her play in each round depending on the outcomes of all previous rounds. However, Press & Dyson [24] have shown that a memory-1 player, whose choice depends only on the previous round, can treat all opponents as though they also have memory-1. We therefore assume that players all have memory-1, without loss of generality (see SI). The strategy of such a player is described by the probabilities of cooperation given the four possible outcomes of the previous round: p = (p cc , p cd , p dc , p dd ). The longterm average payoff to player X facing opponent Y , s xy , can be calculated directly from her strategy p x , her opponent's strategy p y , her payoffs R x , and her opponent's payoffs R y . In the context of evolutionary game theory these payoffs contribute to the player's fitness, which determines her expected reproductive success in an evolving population (Fig. 1) .
The strategies that tend to dominate in a replicating population of players can be understood in terms of evolutionary robustness [21, 25] . A strategy is evolutionary robust if no other strategy is favored to replace it by natural selection -i.e. with a probability exceeding 1/N in a population of size N (see SI). This is a weaker condition than that of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) [20, 30] . Robustness is a useful notion because, when evolution occurs on the full set of memory-1 strategies, there is rarely if ever a single ESS, as many strategies p x = p y are neutrally equivalent and can replace each other by genetic drift. We therefore focus on the set of evolutionary robust strategies, which are neutral to one another but resist replacement by any strategy outside of the set. Indeed, the evolutionary robust strategies are known to dominate populations playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma [21, 25] .
We expand the traditional purview of evolutionary game theory by allowing heritable mutations to a player's payoffs, as well as to her strategies, so that the composition of payoffs and strategies in a population co-evolve over time. We first consider evolution in the donation game, a form of Prisoner's Dilemma [25, 27] , in which a player extracts a benefit B if her opponent cooperates and must pay a cost C if she cooperates, resulting in payoffs R(cc) = B − C, R(cd) = −C, R(dc) = B, and R(dd) = 0. Each player therefore has an incentive to defect, although the players would receive a greater total payoff for mutual cooperation. It is natural to assume a tradeoff, so that mutations that increase (or decrease) the benefit of cooperation, B, will also increase (or decrease) the cost of cooperation, C. We therefore enforce the linear relation B = γC + k with γ > 1 among the allowable mutations to payoffs.
Starting with a donation game that favors cooperative strategies [25] , how will strategies and payoffs co-evolve over time? As Figure 2 shows, evolution favors increasing both the benefits and costs of cooperation, making the Prisoner's Dilemma increasingly more acute. This evolution of the payoff matrix is accompanied by a dramatic loss of cooperative strategies, so that the population is eventually dominated by defectors (Figure 2a) . Remarkably, defectors come to dominate even as the payoffs available for mutual cooperation continually increase (Fig. 2b) . Moreover, this collapse of cooperation is often accompanied by an erosion of mean population fitness (Fig. 2c ). There is a simple intuition for this disheartening evolutionary outcome: initially, the population is composed of cooperators and so mutations that increase the reward for mutual cooperation, B −C, are favored. But such mutations also increase the ratio B/(B −C), the temptation to defect, to such a point that defectors eventually outcompete cooperators.
We can understand the collapse of cooperation, and the co-evolution of strategies and payoffs more generally, by determining which strategies are evolutionary robust and how robustness varies as payoffs
p=(pcc, pcd, pdc, pdd) cc cd dc dd Figure 1 : Evolving the rules of the game. We model evolution in a population of N players who face each other in iterated, two-player games. Each individual has a "genotype" consisting of a strategy, p, and a payoff matrix, R.
The payoffs received by a pair of players X and Y depends on both players' strategies and payoff matrices. Mutations are introduced that change either a player's strategy or her payoff matrix. Mutant strategies are drawn uniformly from the four-dimensional space of memory-1 strategies. Mutant payoff matrices are chosen according to a particular mutation scheme of interest. Natural selection and genetic drift occur according to a "copying" process [29] , in which two players, X and Y , are selected at random from the population, and Y adopts the genotype of X with probability f y→x = 1/(1 + exp[σ(s y − s x )]), where s x and s y are the payoffs the players receive in match-ups against the entire population, and σ is the strength of selection. Given a new mutant X introduced into a population with resident strategy Y , X replaces Y with probability [29] 
evolve. To do so, we have analytically characterized all possible evolutionary robust strategies for arbitrary 2 × 2 two-player iterated games (Fig. 3 , and SI). In particular, we have proven the following necessary condition: a robust strategy must be one of three types: self-cooperate, self-defect, or self-alternate. Self-cooperative strategies C will cooperate at equilibrium against an opponent using the same strategy, meaning p cc = 1. Conversely, self-defecting strategies D satisfy p dd = 0. Self-alternating strategies A alternate between cooperation and defection in subsequent rounds, meaning p cd = 0 and p dc = 1 (see SI). Monte-Carlo simulations in the full space of memory-1 strategies confirm that populations adopt one of these three types > 97% of the time, reflecting that all robust strategies fall within these three types. However, the robust strategies are strict subsets of these types and, crucially, the volume of robust strategies within each type depends on the payoffs of the game (Fig. 3) . The robust volumes within these types can be computed analytically (see SI) and they determine whether cooperation, defection, or alternation dominates in a population (Fig. 2a,b) . The collapse of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. We simulated populations playing the donation game, proposing both mutant strategies and mutant payoffs at equal rates, µ/2. Mutations to strategies were drawn uniformly from the full space of memory-1 strategies. Mutations to payoffs were drawn so that increasing benefits of cooperation incur increasing costs: mutations perturbing the benefit B by ∆ were drawn uniformly from the range ∆ ∈ [−0.1, 0.1], with the corresponding change to cost C chosen to enforce the relationship B = γC + k. Evolution was modelled according to an imitation process under weak mutation [25, 27, 29] . (a) Cooperative strategies are initially robust and dominate the population, but they are quickly replaced by defectors as payoffs evolve. Dots indicate the proportion of 10 5 replicate simulated populations, at each time point, within distance δ = 0.01 of the three strategy types self-cooperate, self-defect, and self-alternate. Lines indicate analytic predictions for the frequencies of these strategy types, which depend upon the corresponding volumes of robust strategies (see SI). (b) As payoffs evolve, the Prisoner's Dilemma becomes more acute, with both greater costs C and benefits B of cooperation. Cooperation collapses even though the payoff for mutual cooperation, B − C, increases over time. (c) The mean population fitness (payoff) often declines over time, depending on the choice of parameter γ. Populations of size N = 100 were initiated with B = 3 and C = 1, and evolved under selection strength σ = 1 (strong selection), with γ = 1.5 in panels a,b.
For the donation game illustrated in Figure 2 the evolutionary robust strategies satisfy
for cooperating, defecting, and alternating strategies respectively. According to these equations, as the ratio B/C decreases -that is, as the Prisoner's Dilemma becomes more acute -the volume of the robust cooperating strategies decreases whereas the volume of robust defecting strategies grows. Thus it is the ratio of benefit to cost that matters for the prospects of cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, as payoffs and strategies co-evolve. Enforcing the payoff structure of the donation game restricts the population to a Prisoner's Dilemma. However, our analysis applies to arbitrary 2 × 2 games and mutation schemes, and so it can permit evolution between qualitatively different types of games. To explore this possibility, we considered a natural generalization of the payoffs above by introducing another class of mutations that enable a "sucker" to recover some portion α of her lost benefit, resulting in the payoff scheme: R(cc) = B − C, R(cd) = −C +αB, R(dc) = B, and R(dd) = 0. As before, we allow the payoffs B and C to evolve together enforcing a linear relationship, and we additionally allow α ∈ [0, 1] to evolve independently. This mutation scheme can produce any possible 2 × 2 game. In particular, when α < C/B the payoffs correspond to a Prisoner's Dilemma whereas when α > C/B the payoffs encode a Snowdrift game [17] [18] [19] [20] . Fig. 4 shows the emergence of a qualitatively new game in a population initialized at the Prisoner's
Region of robust defecting strategies
Region of robust cooperating strategies
Region of robust alternating strategies an evolutionary robust memory-1 strategy must be one of three possible types: those that cooperate against an opponent who cooperates (left, p cc = 1), those that defect against an opponent who defects (center, p dd = 0), and those that alternate between cooperate and defect against an alternating opponent (right, p cd = 0 and p dc = 1).
Within each of these strategy types, the strict subsets that are evolutionary robust can be determined analytically from the payoff matrix, as indicated on the figure (see SI for full derivations). The regions of robust cooperating and robust defecting strategies are three-dimensional, whereas the robust alternating strategies are two-dimensional. Monte Carlo simulations exploring the full space of memory-1 strategies confirm that these are the only evolutionary robust solutions (Fig. S1 ). As payoffs evolve in a population, the volumes of robust strategies change according to the equations in the figure, and they determine the evolutionary dynamics of cooperating, defecting, and alternating strategies (Fig. 2 ).
Dilemma. As payoffs and strategies co-evolve the benefits and costs of cooperation initially increase, resulting again in the collapse of cooperation (Fig. 4a ). But this collapse is quickly followed by an increase in α, as the few remaining "suckers" seek to recover payoffs lost to defecting opponents (Fig. 4b) . Eventually the Snowdrift game emerges (Fig. 4b) , and the population is thereafter dominated by alternating strategies (Fig. 4a) . The instability of the Prisoner's Dilemma in favor of the Snowdrift game is striking -α achieves its maximum value and the payoffs B and C continually increase, producing increasingly acute versions of the Snowdrift game. We have assumed throughout that payoff mutations are "private", meaning that the player who receives a payoff mutation unilaterally receives the increase (or decrease) in benefit and costs. However our results are largely unchanged if we assume instead that payoff mutations are "public", so that both a player and her opponent share the costs of these mutations (Fig. S7) . The only additional requirement is that payoff mutations increasing B and C are sufficiently beneficial that such a mutant can invade the resident population (see SI). Our results on the collapse of cooperation also hold under weak selection (i.e. N σ ∼ 1; see SI), and also when mutations to payoffs are more rare than mutations to strategies ( Figure S3 -S6).
We have focused on payoff mutations that enforce a tradeoff, by simultaneously increasing the benefits and costs of cooperation. However, our framework for analyzing payoff-strategy co-evolution, based on computing the evolutionary robustness of strategy sets, can be applied to any mutation scheme and can produce a potentially vast array of evolutionary outcomes. For example, if mutations increase the benefit B whilst leaving the cost C unchanged then cooperation will remain stable in the population (Fig. S5) . The appropriate mutation scheme depends upon the biological context. Examples of the tradeoff we have studied are found at many scales [10, 11, 31] , from human societies, where individuals modulate how frequently and how much they punish free-riders [10, 32] , to micro-organism, such as the marine bacteria Vibrionaceae [11] . In Vibrionaceae populations, for example, individuals cooperate in a public-goods game by sharing siderophores required for iron acquisition. Mutations that alter the siderophore biosynthetic pathway alter an individual's strategy, by changing its contribution to the public good; mutations that improve the siderophore transport pathway alter an individual's payoffs, by imposing a greater metabolic cost along with an increased benefit from the public good. In these Vibrionaceae populations, as well as many other biological systems with opportunities for cooperative interactions [11, 31, [33] [34] [35] [36] , defectors are often found at high frequency in nature, as our analysis predicts when mutations increase both the costs and benefits of cooperation. Analyses that allow both stategies and payoffs to co-evolve in a poulation significantly expands the scope, and qualitatively alters the predictions, of evolutionary game theory applied to biological systems.
Appendix
In this supplement we prove that only three types of strategies -alternators, cooperators, or defectorsare evolutionary robust and prevalent in arbitrary iterated two-player games with a 2 × 2 payoff matrix. We derive analytic expressions for the subsets of these strategy types that are evolutionary robust. We show that the volume of robust alternators, cooperators, and defectors can be used to approximate the time spent by a population at each of these strategy types, for a fixed payoff matrix. As shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 of the main text, this analysis enables us to explain evolution in iterated two-player games even when payoff matrices are allowed to evolve. In particular, this analysis predicts the collapse of cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (Fig. 2) , as well as the transition from the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma to the Snowdrift game (Fig. 4) . We first define evolutionary robustness for an arbitrary iterated two-player game with a 2 × 2 payoff matrix in a well-mixed population of finite size N ; and we state necessary and sufficient conditions for robustness under the limits of either strong or weak selection. We then show that, under strong selection, only three subsets of memory-1 strategies can be evolutionary robust and prevalent: self-cooperate, selfdefect and self-alternate. Within each of these three strategy types we derive the precise subset that are robust, and from this we calculate the volume of robust strategies of each type. Under weak selection, by contrast, we show that only the self-cooperate and self-alternate strategies can be evolutionary robust.
Finally we perform simulations under weak mutation for a variety of payoff mutation schemes, in addition to those used in the main text. These simulations demonstrate that the volume of robust strategies within each of these types continues to determine the outcome of payoff-strategy co-evolution in finite populations.
Iterated two-player games
We consider an iterated two-player game with an infinite number of successive rounds between two players, X and Y . We study games with a 2 × 2 payoff matrix, so that in each round each player has two choices, denoted cooperate (c) or defect (d). The payoffs for the respective players are given in Table S1 , in their most general form. Table S1 : Payoff matrix for an arbitrary 2 × 2 game
We study evolution in a well-mixed, finite population of N haploid, memory-1 individuals under weak mutation. This means that, at any point in time, the population is monomorphic for some payoff matrix R = (R(cc), R(cd), R(dc), R(dd)) and some strategy p = (p cc , p cd , p dc , p dd ). Mutations are introduced that alter a player's payoff or her strategy. The probability that such a mutation fixes in the population is calculated analytically for the imitation process [29] , as described in Fig. 1 of the main text.
Memory:
In general, a player may have an arbitrarily long memory, such that her play in each round depends on the plays in all previous rounds. However, as per Press and Dyson [24] , a player with memory-1 may treat all opponents as though they are also memory-1, regardless of the opponent's actual memory. And so the sets of scores s xx , s xy and s yx for a player X with memory-1 facing an opponent Y with arbitrary memory can be understood by considering the scores received by X against an arbitrary memory-1 opponent instead. Nevertheless the score a long-memory player Y received against himself, s yy , may depend on his memory capacity. Nonetheless, since our results for strong selection do not depend on s yy , we will show that a robust strategy for a memory-1 player X is robust against all opponents, regardless of their memory. Under weak selection, the robustness of a strategy may depend on s yy , however, as shown in [25] for the Prisoner's Dilemma, we can still derive conditions for evolutionary robustness under weak selection that do not depend on the memory of Y .
Equilibrium payoffs in Iterated Games: The longterm scores received by two players using memory-1 strategies in an iterated two-player game are calculated from the equilibrium rates of the different plays, (cc), (cd), (dc) and (dd), given by the stationary vector v = (v cc , v cd , v dc , v dd ) of the Markov matrix describing the iterated game [21] . The equilibrium score of player X against player Y is calculated according to
where I = (1, 1, 1, 1), p x and q y are the strategies of players X and Y , and R x is the payoff matrix of player X. The determinant D(p x , q y , f ) gives the dot product between the stationary vector v and an arbitrary vector f = (f cc , f cd , f dc , f dd ) [24] , where
In general Eq. 1 is sufficient to calculate the scores received by a pair of memory-1 players. However, there are certain pathological cases in which the Markov chain describing the iterated game has multiple absorbing states, and does not converge. The scores in these cases can be calculated by assuming that players execute their strategy with some small "error rate" [3] , so that the probability of cooperation is at most 1 − and at least . Assuming this, and taking the limit → 0 then gives the player's scores in the cases where multiple absorbing states exist.
Alternate coordinate system: As shown in [21, 24, 25] , manipulations of Eq. 1 produce an alternate coordinate system for the four-dimensional space of memory-1 strategies, useful for analysing the outcomes of two-player games. In particular, we can convert from the basis (p cc , p cd , p dc , p dd ) to the basis (φ, χ, κ, λ) [21, 24, 25] , where the two coordinate systems are related bỹ
Herep
, and L = (0, 1, 1, 0). To convert directly between the two coordinate systems we have the equations
For completeness we have given the coordinate transform for the general case in which R x = R y . Henceforth we will be concerned with monomorphic populations in which R x = R y = R. In this coordinate scheme the players' scores are related by [21, 25] 
This relationship, which depends on the equilibrium rate of playing (cd) and (dc), can be used to determine analytic conditions for the evolutionary robust strategies of an arbitrary 2 × 2 game.
Useful inequalities: In addition to the relationship Eq. 5 we make note of four inequalities which we will use to determine the strategies that are evolutionary robust. We begin by noting that the equilibrium payoff for X playing against an opponent Y is given by [21] 
(i) From Eq. 6, the difference between the two players' scores can be written as
which gives
where equality is achieved by an opponent Y for whom v cd = 0 (e.g. an opponent who always cooperates).
(ii) Similarly, we must have
where equality is achieved by an opponent Y for whom v dc = 0 (e.g. an opponent who never cooperates).
(iii) From Eq. 6, the sum of the two players' scores is
and, since v cc + (v dc + v cd ) ≤ 1, we have
where equality is achieved when v dd = 0 (e.g. by an opponent who never defects once they have been defected against).
(iv) Finally, we also have
where equality is achieved when v cc = 0 (e.g. by an opponent who always defects once they have been cooperated with).
Evolutionary robustness under strong selection
We will use the above relations to determine which strategies are evolutionary robust in a population of N players. The concept of evolutionary robustness [25] is similar to the traditional notion of evolutionary stability [20, 30] . An evolutionary stable strategy p x is one that satisfies either s xx > s yx , or else s xx = s yx and s xy > s yy , for all opponents p y = p x [20, 30] . This means that a strategy is evolutionary stable provided (i) it cannot be selectively invaded by any other strategy, and (ii) it can selectively invade any strategy that can neutrally invade it. However, as shown in [21, 25] , evolutionary stable strategies rarely exist within the full space of memory-1 strategies, because many strategies are neutral against each other. Instead, we use the notion of evolutionary robustness. A strategy X is evolutionary robust if, when resident in a population of size N , it cannot be selectively replaced by any mutant Y . More precisely, a resident strategy X is defined to be evolutionary robust if the fixation probability of any new mutant Y satisfies ρ yx ≤ 1/N . Under the "copying" model of [29] the probability that a new mutant Y fixes in a population otherwise comprised of resident X is given by
As shown previously [21, 25] , evolutionary robustness, as opposed to evolutionary stability, is useful for characterizing the strategies that dominate in evolving populations. In the remainder of the supplement we first derive results for evolutionary robustness under strong selection, which are used in the main text. We then derive conditions for evolutionary robustness under weak selection.
Necessary conditions for strategies to be robust under strong selection
We start by proving that strategies in the interior of the four-dimensional memory-1 strategy space cannot be evolutionary robust -that is, they can always be selectively invaded by some other strategy. In fact, we will show that nothing on the interior can be robust with the exception of the "equalizers", discussed below.
Consider a resident strategy X characterised by (φ x , χ x , κ x , λ x ) and a mutant strategy Y characterised by (φ y , χ y , κ y , λ y ). From Eq. 5, with y = x, we find that the payoff of the resident against itself is
Similarly, from Eq. 5 we find that the payoff of Y against X is
where v is the stationary vector for X playing against itself and w is the stationary vector for X playing against Y . First suppose that X satisfies 0 ≤ p cc < 1 and 0 < p dd ≤ 1. Then suppose Y is chosen such that χ x = χ y and φ x = φ y . We can then write
.
We also choose λ y such that (1 − χ x )κ x − λ x = (1 − χ y )κ y − λ y i.e. so that p cd and p dc are unaltered by the mutation. This gives
We can then write
and so Y selectively invades X iff
This inequality can always be satisfied unless v cd + v dc = 1, in which case both sides vanish and the mutation is neutral. To see this, we use Eq. 2 to calculate
and assume that the mutant is such that κ y = κ x + η where η is small. We can then write
or, more conveniently
where A depends on the resident strategy and is finite (but can be zero). The condition for invasion of X by Y then becomes
Aη which can always be satisfied (since we can always invert the sign of η by decreasing κ x instead of increasing it). The only exception occurs when both sides of the inequality vanish, i.e. if w cd + w dc = v cd + v dc = 1, and A = 0, or if χ x = λ x = 0 (we will deal will the latter case separately). Solving for v cd + v dc = 1 gives solutions p cd = 1, p dc = 0 or p cd = 0, p dc = 1. Replacing these into the equation for w cd + w dc gives A = 0. Therefore any strategy X with 0 < p cc < 1 and 0 < p dd < 1 can be selectively invaded unless p cd = 1 and p dc = 0, or p cd = 0 and p dc = 1 -that is, unless X alternates.
In the boundary cases p cc = 0 or p dd = 1, φ takes a maximal value, and an increase in κ necessitates a corresponding decrease in φ to ensure all probabilities are in the range [0, 1]. However, the same argument holds as above, since small changes in κ and φ together precipitate a small change in v cd + v dc ; so that even in these boundary cases, X can be selectively invaded unless p cd = 1 and p dc = 0, or p cd = 0 and p dc = 1 -that is, unless X alternates.
The alternating strategies discussed so far come in two forms. However, we can show that the alternating strategies of the form p cd = 1 and p dc = 0 cannot be robust. It is easy to construct a mutant that can selectively invade such strategies: if we assume, without loss of generality, that R(dc) > R(cd), then an opponent with p dc = 0 and p cd < 1 scores R(dc) at equilibrium, whereas such an alternator scores (1/2)(R(cd) + R(dc)) against itself. Therefore the mutant can selectively invade and this strategy type cannot be robust. The only exception occurs in the special case R(cd) = R(dc), in which case both types of alternators score identically. Henceforth we consider only alternators of the form p cd = 0 and p dc = 1, because only these alternators have the potential to be evolutionary robust. Now we consider the cases X that satisfy p cc = 1 or p dd = 0, that is the self-cooperators and selfdefectors. To address these cases, we can use the same procedure as above. We consider a mutant Y such that κ x = κ y , χ x = χ y and φ x = φ y . This has the effect that p cc and p dd remain constant under mutation. We then have
and Y can selectively invade iff
As in the previous case, it is easy to show that a small change η in λ x gives (w cd + w dc ) − (v cd + v dc ) = Aη where A depends on the resident strategy. We then have
Once again, this can always be satisfied by either increasing or decreasing λ x . The only exception occurs if both sides vanish so that the mutant is neutral, i.e. if w cd + w dc = v cd + v dc = 0 and A = 0, or λ x = χ x = 0 (called equalizers, see below). The former case occurs iff either (i) X is a self-cooperator with p cc = 1, (ii) X is a self-defector with p dd = 0, or (iii) X satisfies p cc = 0 and p dd = 1. However the case p cc = 0 and p dd = 1 can be selectively invaded, as shown above, and it is therefore not robust. Therefore, in total, we have proven that any evolutionary robust strategy for an arbitrary 2 × 2 game must be one of following four types:
• the cooperators C = {(p cc , p cd , p dc , p dd ) |p cc = 1},
• the equalizers E = {(φ, χ, κ, λ)|λ = χ = 0}.
Finally, any strategy that falls in the intersection of two types above (e.g. those satisfying both p cc = 1 and p dd = 0) cannot be robust. Such a "mixed-type" strategy X will receive a score s xx that is a linear combination of the scores received by a "pure-type" strategy. However whichever pure-type strategy receives the higher of the two scores against itself can invade such a "mixed-type" strategy.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for evolutionary robustness under strong selection
As discussed above, a strategy that is evolutionary robust in an arbitrary 2 × 2 game must belong to one of the four types: alternators, cooperators, defectors, or equilizers. We now derive sufficient conditions for strategies of each of these types to be robust.
The Cooperators: The cooperators C satisfy p cc = 1 and score s xx = R(cc) against themselves, which corresponds to κ = R(cc). In order to invade a resident strategy X, a mutant Y must have
Combining this with Eq. 5, Eq. 9, and Eq. 10, and rearranging, we find that Y can selectively invade iff
Converting back to our original coordinate system, this implies an alternator X is robust iff:
The evolutionary robust cooperating strategies are thus described by the set
These analytic expressions for the robust cooperating strategies are confirmed by Monte-Carlo simulations (Fig. S1 ).
The Defectors: The defectors D satisfy p dd = 0 and score s xx = R(dd) against themselves, which corresponds to κ = R(dd). In order to invade, a mutant Y must therefore have
using this, as well as Eq. 5, Eq. 7 and Eq. 9, we find that a strategy Y can invade iff
Converting back to our original coordinate system, this implies that an alternator X is robust iff:
The evolutionary robust defecting strategies are thus described by the set
These analytic expressions for the robust defecting strategies are confirmed by Monte-Carlo simulations (Fig. S1 ).
The Alternators: The alternators A satisfy p cd = 0 and p dc = 1. Using Eq. 4, and converting to the alternate coordinate system, we have
for strategies of this type. From Eq. 5, a resident strategy X of this type has
In order to selectively invade the resident, then, a mutant Y must satisfy
The evolutionary robust alternating strategies are thus described by the set
These analytic expressions for the robust alternating strategies are confirmed by Monte-Carlo simulations (Fig. S1 ).
Characteristics of evolutionary robust strategies: We have identified the robust subsets of alternators, cooperators and defectors, A r , C r and D r , which cannot be selectively invaded, under strong selection. The inequalities Eqs. 11-13 defining these robust strategies in fact guarantee that any invading strategy is selected against, unless it satisfies w cd + w dc = 1 in the case of Alternators, or w cd + w dc = 0 in the case of Cooperators and Defectors -in which case both sides of the inequality vanish and the mutant is neutral. The mutant strategies that satisfy these conditions are precisely those of the same type (Alternator, Cooperator or Defector) as the resident. In other words, the only strategies that can neutrally replace robust alternators are other alternating strategies; and the only strategies that can neutrally replace robust cooperators are other cooperators; and the only strategies that can neutrally replace robust defectors are other defectors.
The Equalizers: Finally, we must deal with the case of the Equalizers [37] , which have χ = λ = 0. From Eq. 5, we see that such strategies satisfy s yx = κ against any invader Y . Thus, a population of Equalizers is neutral against all possible invaders. The equalizer strategies are thus evolutionary robust. However, unlike the other sets of robust strategies (C r , D r , A r ), which resist replacement by any other strategy type, equalizers never resist invasion, and so they tend to be quickly lost from a population through neutral drift. Therefore we exclude them from our further discussion of robust strategies and, indeed, we find that populations spend very little time (< 0.01%) at the equalizers.
Volume of a robust strategy type: We can use Eqs. 11-13 to calculate the volumes associated with each robust strategy type. In the case of the Alternators the volume of A r is in fact a 2D surface of area
where, in addition, we must constrain the area so that only strategies within the unit square are included. Similarly, C r has cross-sections of area
and its volume is calculated by integration, with the limits of integration chosen to include only strategies lying within the unit cube. Finally, D r has cross-sections of area
and its volume is calculated by integrating across those strategies lying within the unit cube.
Time spent at different strategy types: We now use our results on the volumes of robust strategies to approximate the time spent at the different strategy types -cooperators, defectors, and alternators -for fixed payoffs under strong selection. To make this analytical approximation we will assume that the population spends all of its time at these three strategy types, an approximation motivated by the fact that these types contain all the evolutionary robust strategies (except for the equilizers, which are quickly replaced through neutral drift). Indeed, Monte Carlo simulations confirm that populations spend > 97% of their time at alternators, cooperators or defectors, for values of payoffs ranging across an order of magnitude.
To approximate the amount of time a population spends in C, D or A, we simply the evolution of strategies in population as a three-state Markov chain (Fig. S2) . We assume that the probability g of entering a strategy type is given by the probability that a robust strategy of that type replaces a randomly drawn memory-1 strategy. We assume that non-robust strategies can be neglected, because although they may be able to invade, they can quickly be reinvaded. The probability of the population adopting an alternator strategy under in this three-state chain is then
where q is integrated over the set of robust alternating strategies, p is integrated over the full set of memory-1 strategy, ρ(p, q) is the probability that a resident strategy p is replaced by a robust alternator q, and V A is the two-dimensional area comprised by robust alternators. The term δ 2 V a denotes the volumes of all memory-1 strategies within Euclidean distance δ of the robust alternators, called the δ-neighborhood of the robust alternators [25, 27] . The constant term Z normalizes the probability of adopting a strategy, so that g a + g c + g d = 1. Similarly, the probability of the system adopting a robust cooperator is
and the probability of the system adopting a robust defector strategy
Once at a robust strategy, we know that, under strong selection, the system evolves neutrally amongst strategies of the same type (C, D, or A). The probability h of leaving a strategy type is therefore the probability that a randomly drawn memory-1 strategy replaces a randomly drawn resident of that type.
For the alternators we have
where q is integrated over all alternator strategies A. Similarly we have
for cooperators, where q is integrated over all cooperator strategies C. and
for defectors, where q is integrated over all alternator strategies D. The stationary distribution of this three-state Markov chain with these transition probabilities can be readily found to give
for the probability of the system to be at an alternator strategy,
for the probability of the system to be at a cooperator strategy, and
for the probability of the system to be at a defector strategy.
As shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 of the main text, the analytic expressions above for the amount of time spent at each strategy type, given the current payoff matrix, provide very good approximations for the actual occupancy times observed in Monte-Carlo simulations over all strategies, even as the payoff matrix evolves.
Relaxation of assumptions
We now relax each of three assumptions made in the main text: strong selection, rapid mutations to payoffs, and "private" mutations to payoffs.
Necessary conditions for robustness under weak selection: We have so far assumed that selection is strong. However, we can relax this assumption, and consider instead the robustness of strategies in the regime of weak selection, N → ∞ with N σ fixed, as in [25] . In this regime, we will first show that only the three strategy types, alternators, cooperators and defectors, can potentially be robust, just as under strong selection. We will then further show that under weak selection, a robust strategy must maximize the sum of a player's score and her opponent's score -which implies that defectors are never robust under weak selection.
Under weak selection the condition for a strategy Y to selectively replace a resident X is (N − 2)(s yy − 2s xx + 2s yx − s xy ) > 3(s xy − s yx ) (16) where N is the population size [5] . First we derive necessary conditions for robustness. Recall that, for a resident strategy X we can write
for the payoff of X against itself and the payoff of a mutant Y against X is
Similarly we have
for the payoff of Y against itself and the payoff of a mutant X against Y is
consider, as before, a resident strategy with p cc < 1 and p dd > 0, along with a mutation that results in a small change to κ y = κ x + η, and a small change to λ y so that (1 − χ x )κ x − λ x = (1 − χ y )κ y − λ y . We then have
as well as
and
Also note that (v * cd +v * dc ) − (v cd + v dc ) = A * η where A * is finite and is zero if p cd = 0 and p dc = 1 or p cd = 1 and p dc = 0. We can then write
where terms O η 2 and greater have been neglected. Replacing these expressions into Eq. 16 gives
This can always be satisfied unless v cd + v dc = 1 and A * + A = 0, which occurs iff p cd = 0 and p dc = 1 or p cd = 1 and p dc = 0, i.e. if the resident is an alternating strategy.
Similarly, we can consider mutations that change λ x by a small amount, for strategies with 0 < p cd < 1 and 0 < p dc < 1. The resulting payoffs following such a mutation are
where in this case A * = 0 if p cc = 1 or if p dd = 0. We also have
Replacing these expressions into Eq. 16 gives
which can always be satisfied unless v cd + v dc = 0 and A + A * = 0, which occurs iff p cc = 1 or p dd = 0, i.e. if the resident strategy is either a cooperator or a defector.
Thus, in total, we have shown that only alternators, cooperators and defectors can be robust under weak selection. However we can also construct a strategy that will selectively replace any resident that does not achieve the maximum possible score against itself. To see this, consider a resident alternator with p cd = 0 and p dc = 1, which scores s xx = (1/2)(R(cd) + R(dc)). If 2R(cc) > R(cd) + R(dc), we can construct a mutant Y with p cd = 0, p dc = 1 and p cc = 1. Such a mutant scores s yx = s xy = s xx . However it also scores s yy = (1/2)(R(cc) + s xx ) (assuming that there is an error rate in the player's execution of their strategy [3] ). Therefore we have s yy > s xx , which means that Y is selected to replace X, according to Eq. 16. A similar argument holds for any resident of the type alternator, cooperator or defector, unless s xx is maximum. This implies that, in fact, under weak selection only cooperators or alternators can be robust, since by definition defectors do not maximize their scores.
Note that a memory-1 strategy that is robust under weak selection is robust against all opponents, regardless of their memory. Although the robustness conditions under weak selection depend on s yy , we have shown that in order to be robust s xx must be maximized. As a result, no opponent can do better against himself than a resident robust strategy does against herself.
The collapse of cooperation under weak selection: Sufficient conditions for a strategy to be robust under weak selection can be found using Eqs. 5-10 along with Eq. 16. The case 2R(cc) > R(dc) + R(cd), for example, in which only a subset of cooperators are robust, has been studied by [25] . For the donation game, these conditions reduce to
Using Eq. 1 to convert back to the standard coordinate system we have
Just as in the case of strong selection, the volume of robust cooperative strategies shrinks as the ratio of benefits to costs shrinks. And so this analysis predicts a collapse of cooperation as payoffs evolve towards higher values. This behavior is indeed confirmed by Monte-Carlo simulations (Fig. S3) , illustrating that the collapse of cooperation occurs under both strong and weak selection.
Alternate mutation schemes:
We have focused in the main text on a mutation scheme in which γ = 1.5, so that costs and benefits occur in the relationship B = 1.5C + k. However, the collapse of cooperation persists, to a lesser or greater extent, when larger or smaller values of γ are considered, as shown in Fig. S4 . However, in the limiting case, where B can increase independently of C, self-cooperators become more successful as B evolves, and no collapse in cooperation is observed (Fig. S5 ).
Slow mutations to payoffs:
In the main text we assumed that mutations to payoffs and mutations to strategies occur at equal rates. This assumption can be relaxed to allow for the scenario in which mutations that change payoffs are relatively more rare. As shown in Fig. S6 the collapse of cooperation persists even when mutations to payoffs are rare.
Public mutations:
We have assumed that mutations to payoffs affect only the individual carrying the mutation. This assumption can be relaxed in a number of ways, to reflect the fact that a social interaction is occurring. One natural alternative is to assume that the cost C is paid by the opponent, so that the payoffs received by a player X facing an opponent Y are R x (cc) = B x − C y , R x (cd) = −C y , R x (dc) = B x and R x (dd) = 0. That is, the opponent sets the cost. Under this mutation scheme we again find that higher payoffs evolve, precipitating again the collapse of cooperation (Fig. S7 ).
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Alternating strategies Defecting strategies Figure S1 -Confirmation by Monte-Carlo simulation of analytical conditions for evolutionary robustness of strategies. For each of the three strategy types, cooperators (p cc = 1), defectors (p dd = 0), and alternators (p cd = 0 and p dc = 1), we compare analytic expression for evolutionary robustness (black lines) with numerical calculations of robustness (light blue regions). Coordinates (κ, χ) for the alternating strategies and (λ, χ) for cooperators and defectors were sampled in regular intervals of 0.01 within the space of all feasible strategies (outlined in red). For each sampled pair of co-ordinates (λ, χ) we also sampled 10 3 associated values of φ, ranging from φ → 0 to the maximum feasible φ. To determine numerically whether a focal strategy X = (λ, χ, φ) is robust we computed the longterm payoffs s xx , s yy , s xy and s yx against 10 6 opponent strategies, Y , drawn uniformly from all memory-1 strategies. A focal strategy X was designated as robust if no strategy Y was found with a score s yx > s xx . Parameters are N = 100, σ = 10, R(cc) = R = 3, R(cd) = S = 0, R(dc) = T = 5 and R(dd) = P = 1. Figure S2 -A simplified, three-state Markov chain to describe evolution of strategies in two-player games. The transition rates are as given by Eqs. 14-15. In this simplified model we assume that the time spent away from these three strategy types can be neglected. This approximation is supported by simulations on the full space of strategies, which indicate that such populations occupy one of these three strategy types > 97% of the time. Figure S4 -The collapse of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma under different mutation schemes. We simulated populations under weak mutation, proposing both mutant strategies and mutant payoffs at equal rates, µ/2. Mutations to strategies were drawn uniformly from the full space of memory-1 strategies. Mutations to payoffs were drawn so that increasing benefits of cooperation incur increasing costs: mutations perturbing the benefit B by ∆ were drawn uniformly from the range ∆ ∈ [−0.1, 0.1], with the corresponding change to cost C chosen to enforce the relationship B = γC + k with γ = 1.1 (left) or γ = 2.0 (right). Evolution was modelled according to an imitation process under weak mutation [25, 27, 29] . Cooperative strategies are initially robust and dominate the population, but they are quickly replaced by defectors as payoffs evolve. Dots indicate the proportion of 10 5 replicate populations, at each time point, within distance δ = 0.01 of the three strategy types self-cooperate, self-defect, and self-alternate. Lines indicate analytic predictions for the frequencies of these strategy types, which depend upon the corresponding volumes of robust strategies. Simulations were run until each population had experienced 5 × 10 5 mutations. Populations of size N = 100 were initiated with B = 3 and C = 1, and evolved under selection strength σ = 1 (strong selection). Figure S5 -Co-evolution of strategies and payoffs when B and C are allowed to evolve independently. We simulated populations under weak mutation as in Fig. 2a , except that mutations altering the benefit B of cooperation no longer alter the cost C, which is kept constant at C = 1. Since there is no tradeoff between costs and benefits in the mutation scheme, the benefits alone tend to increase over time, and cooperative strategies remain robust and continue to dominate the population, as payoffs evolve. Figure S7 -Public mutation and the collapse of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. We simulated populations under weak mutation, as in Fig. 2a , except that mutations to C are "public" in the sense that the cost of an interaction borne by a player depends on the genotype of her opponent, as described in the supplementary text.
